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INTERPRETATION OF "OTHER MINERALS" IN
A GRANT OR RESERVATION OF A
MINERAL INTEREST
When property owners wish to convey or reserve mineral inter-
ests in their property, they enumerate the specific minerals in the
deed, lease, or other instrument. The phrase "and other minerals"
commonly follows the list of specific minerals granted or reserved.'
Yet, often, the instrument neither defines nor specifies these "other
minerals." The discovery of additional minerals on the property not
anticipated by either the surface or mineral owners2 can cause con-
flicts between the surface and mineral owners, often far removed in
time from the original transaction, over whether the instrument's
"other minerals" language grants or conveys a particular substance.
This Note examines the methods courts use to interpret the
phrase "other minerals" in deeds, leases, and other instruments.
The Note evaluates the extent to which the courts' "traditional for-
mulations" 3 and an approach recently articulated in Moser v. United
States Steel Corp.4 forward two goals for settling mineral rights con-
troversies: ensuring the stability and certainty of land tides and
fairly accommodating the interests of the parties. This evaluation
demonstrates that courts have encountered considerable difficulty
in consistently and efficiently applying any of the traditional formu-
lations. 5 The number and variety of traditional formulations used,
and the difficulty in applying them to new fact patterns, creates con-
I For example, the property owner may convey or reserve "oil, gas, and other min-
erals," "coal, oil, and other minerals," or a multitude of other potential combinations.
See, e.g., McCombs v. Stephenson, 154 Ala. 109, 111, 44 So. 867, 868 (1907) ("all the
coal, ores, and other minerals and metals"); Cain v. Neumann, 3.16 S.W.2d 915, 917
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1958, no writ) ("all of the oil, gas, cbal and other miner-
als"); Eldridge v. Edmondson, 252 S.W.2d 605, 606 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1952,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("all oil, gas, casinghead gas and other minerals"); West Va. Dep't of
Highways v. Farmer, 159 W. Va. 823, 824, 226 S.E.2d 717, 719 (1976) ("oil, gas and
other minerals").
2 Substances not recognized as minerals or as having any independent value may
become valuable with the development of new technologies. In addition, new technol-
ogy may enable production of a previously unrecoverable substance.
3 In this Note "traditional formulations" will refer to the six methods courts fre-
quently employ when determining "other minerals" questions. These methods are the
topic of section II.
4 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984). The court withdrew a previous opinion, 26 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 427 (June 8, 1983), which was never officially reported.
5 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 530 (1903) ("The word
'mineral' is used in so many senses, dependent upon the context, that the ordinary defi-
nitions . . . throw but little light upon its signification in a given case.").
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flict, confusion, and disarray within and among the jurisdictions.6
Conflict and confusion in the courts produce two undesirable re-
sults: uncertainty of land titles and inequitable treatment of the
parties.
In Moser the Texas Supreme Court announced a new method
that provides an efficient and consistent approach to the "other
minerals" question. The Moser approach severs from the surface es-
tate all minerals within the ordinary and natural meaning of the
word 7 and compensates the surface owner for damages to his estate
resulting from extraction of a substance conveyed by an "other min-
erals" clause.8 The Note argues that this approach gives stability
and certainty to land titles while respecting the interests of both par-
ties. The Texas court's "other minerals" formulation will greatly
assist other courts struggling with this question. 9 Those courts
should reject the problem-ridden traditional formulations and im-
plement a new formulation modeled on the Moser approach.
I
THE GOALS OF FORMULATIONS FOR DETERMINING
UNSPECIFIED MINERALS
Two goals should guide courts when they seek to resolve dis-
putes arising from an "other minerals" clause. First, courts should
strive to ensure stability and certainty of land titles by adopting a
generally applicable standard that does not require multiple factual
determinations. Reducing the number of required, factual findings
1
6 See Emery, What Surface is Mineral and What Mineral is Surface, 12 OKLA. L. REV.
499, 501 (1959) ("While some of the decisions may be reconciled, many are apparently
in irreconcilable conflict."); see also Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955, 958 (Okla.
1964) ("The diversity of views is impressive .... "); Beck v. Harvey, 196 Okla. 270,
272, 164 P.2d 399, 401 (Okla. 1944) ("Many of the cases cannot be reconciled .... ");
Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 115, 288 P.2d 452, 454 (1955) (noting "confu-
sion in the authorities" over interpreting mineral grants and reservations); 0. MAT-
THEWS, LEGAL PITFALLS, LAND STATUS AND THE AcQuisITION OF MINERAL RiGHTs 177-79
(1981) ("No consistent policy exists in the state courts .... "); Note, The Surface-Mineral
Dilemma: A Proposed Standard for Mississippi, 48 Miss. LJ. 852, 865 (1977) (calling ap-
proach to "other minerals" question "haphazard").
7 676 S.W.2d at 102.
8 Id. at 103.
9 Texas courts often lead in the evolution of mineral law. Thus, Texas decisions
on mineral law questions will likely influence other states dealing with similar questions.
See Patterson, A Survey of Problems Associated With Ascertaining the Ownership of "Other Miner-
als, "25 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 21, 21-13 (1979) ("Texas represents at least one state,
among a relative few, that has attempted to promulgate a precise set of rules pertaining
to interpretation of instruments involving the ownership of 'other minerals'....");
Note, Moser v. United States Steel Corp.: Owners of "Other Minerals" Hit Pay Dirt as Texas
Buries Acker-Reed Surface Destructimn Test, 5J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 147, 147 (1983) ("Texas
. . .has naturally been viewed as a leader in formulating laws governing the extraction
and production of energy resources.").
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increases stability because parties to subsequent disputes can more
easily duplicate the process of determining the meaning of an
"other minerals" clause. Stability and certainty of land titles also
encourages the development of new mineral resources.' 0 Increased
stability benefits mineral owners who wish to proceed with develop-
ment and surface owners hoping to sever the mineral rights from
their property. Stability also makes each party more certain of the
content and limits of his estate. Indeed, stability means that title
readers, land and mineral owners, and other individuals need not
resort to the judicial system to interpret mineral grants and reserva-
tions accurately.
Second, any "other minerals" formulation that courts adopt
should fairly accommodate the interests of the parties. The courts
must recognize the surface owner's interest in the value of his prop-
erty and the mineral owner's interest in extracting substances from
beneath the surface of the property. Courts should develop a for-
mulation that prevents the forfeiture of either interest and strikes a
balance between the benefits and costs to each owner from develop-
ment or production of "other minerals."
II
TRADITIONAL FORMULATIONS FOR DETERMINING
UNSPECIFIED MINERALS
Courts use the traditional formulations to discern the intent of
the parties when deciding whether an "other minerals" clause em-
braces a particular mineral not specified in the instrument." The
courts often struggle with these decisions because neither party may
have considered the disposition of the substance at issue when he
executed the grant or reservation. 12 In such cases, a court must de-
10 Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 Wyo. LJ. 107, 114 (1949)
(certainty in land titles of utmost importance because of great expense of exploration,
development, and production of minerals). Businessmen and developers are less likely
to initiate costly mineral production projects if they cannot be sure of having clear title
to a substance. Resorting to litigation to determine what a title encompasses is expen-
sive and time-consuming.
I See 1 E. KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 13.3, at 300 (1962)
("general rule of construction that the court will seek the intention of the parties"); IA
W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 135, at 263 (1954) ("The word 'mineral' is not
a definite term, and its meaning must necessarily depend upon the intent with which it is
used.") (footnote omitted); Reeves, The Meaning of the Word "'Minerals, " 54 N.D.L. REV.
419, 444 (1978) ("courts usually say that the purpose of construing an instrument is to
give effect to the intention of the parties").
12 Professor Kuntz criticized judicial efforts to determine the specific intent of the
parties as to any particular unnamed substance:
The contradiction and conflict between the cases on the [other min-
erals] point arise from the very fact that the courts are seeking to give
effect to an intention to include or exclude a specific substance, when, as a
[Vol. 71:618620
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termine "as best as it can, what the intention of the parties would
have been had they thought about the matter."'13 To settle the ques-
tion, courts apply one of the traditional formulations and presume
that their findings conform with the parties' intent.1 4
A. Ejusdem Generis
Courts may apply ejusdem generis 15 to determine whether a
disputed mineral falls within an "other minerals" clause when the
agreement is ambiguous 16 and does not indicate the parties' intent.
matter of fact, the parties had nothing specific in mind on the matter at
all. It is submitted that an intention test is the proper one, but not as
applied heretofore. The intention sought should be the general intent
rather than any supposed but unexpressed specific intent, and, further, that
general intent should be arrived at, not by defining and re-defining the
terms used, but by considering the purposes of the grant or reservation in
terms of manner of enjoyment intended in the ensuing interests.
Kuntz, supra note 10, at 112 (emphasis in original). This is the basis of the "manner of
enjoyment" test discussed infra section III B.
13 Reeves, supra note 11, at 444.
14 One state, North Dakota, has limited judicial interpretation of mineral convey-
ances and reservations by statute. Under the North Dakota law a grant or reservation of
minerals includes all minerals "except those specifically excluded by name;" however,
gravel, clay, and scoria are not granted or reserved unless specifically included by name.
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-10-24 to -25 (Supp. 1985).
Statutes in other states require compensation and special protection for the surface
estate in the event of damage from mineral production. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-
48-106 (1984) (when mineral and surface are severed, surface owner "may demand sat-
isfactory security from the miner, and if it is refused, he may enjoin such miner from
working until such security is given"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 318.1 (West 1969 &
Supp. 1985) (requiring evidence of financial responsibility in form of net worth state-
ment, letter of credit, or bond, to establish ability to comply with requirements for plug-
ging oil and gas wells). See generally Dycus, Legislative Clarification of the Correlative Rights of
Surface and Mineral Owners, 33 VAND. L. REV. 871, 897 (1980) (proposing a "Model Sur-
face Rights Clarification Act"); Walker, The Evolving Dominance of the Surface Estate, 34
INST. ON OIL & GAS. L. & TAX'N 123, 133-37 (1983) (discussing statutes that reduce
mineral estate dominance).
In some instances, especially where former government lands are involved, refer-
ence to legislative history may be necessary to determine what substances are included
in mineral rights. See Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 60 (1983) (holding
gravel a mineral reserved under Stock-Raising Homestead Act).
15 The words "ejusdem generis" mean:
Of the same kind, class, or nature. In the construction of laws, wills, and
other instruments, the "ejusdem generis rule" is, that where general
words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particu-
lar and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or
things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 464 (5th ed. 1979).
16 Courts should apply the doctrine only to ambiguous instruments; an unambigu-
ous instrument needs no aid in construction. See Cole v. McDonald, 236 Miss. 168, 187,
109 So. 2d 628, 637 (1959) (ejusdem generis not applicable where manifest intention of
parties is evident); Anderson & Kerr Drilling Co. v. Bruhlmeyer, 134 Tex. 574, 582, 136
S.W.2d 800, 804-05 (1940) (ejusdem generis merely rule of construction to be used as
"an aid to interpretation when . . . intention is not otherwise apparent"); Burdette v.
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Ejusdem generis is a common rule of construction applied to all
types of legal documents, including deeds, leases, and other instru-
ments conveying or reserving mineral interests. 17 If general lan-
guage such as "other minerals" supplements an enumeration of
specific minerals, the ejusdem generis rule interprets the phrase to
refer only to substances with characteristics similar to the minerals
specifically enumerated,' 8 thus limiting the scope of the "other min-
erals" clause.
Ejusdem generis is a problematic formulation because minerals
may be similar in some characteristics and dissimilar in others.
Courts must arbitrarily emphasize one characteristic over another to
make a determination. In Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands
Co., 19 the court used ejusdem generis to interpret a reservation of
"iron, coal, and other minerals." The court emphasized that be-
cause the enumerated minerals were solids, the grant could not in-
clude oil and gas.20 Other characteristics of the enumerated
minerals that courts might emphasize in applying ejusdem generis
include chemical composition, 2' method of production, 22 or the
practical use of the enumerated minerals, such as use as an energy
Bruen, 118W. Va. 624, 628-29, 191 S.E. 360, 361-62 (1937) (ejusdem generis cannot be
invoked "where the language under consideration is clear and unambiguous as to what
is intended"). But see Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973) (ejusdem
generis applied to concededly unambiguous instrument).
17 Oklahoma courts frequently and consistently apply ejusdem generis to cases de-
termining mineral interests. See, e.g., Panhandle Coop. Royalty Co. v. Cunningham, 495
P.2d 108, 114 (Okla. 1971) (finding it unnecessary to use ejusdem generis, but noting
that "[t]his rule of construction is a useful part of our law"); Vogel v. Cobb, 193 Okla.
64, 67, 141 P.2d 276, 280 (1943) (deed conveying "'oil, petroleum, gas, coal, asphalt
and all other minerals'" did not include water); West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 536 P.2d
393, 397 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975) (holding copper, silver, gold, or other metallic minerals
not included in "oil, gas and other minerals," and discussing Oklahoma's long adher-
ence to ejusdem generis).
Other states have also applied ejusdem generis, although not as consistently as has
Oklahoma. See Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 508 P.2d 896 (1973); State Land Bd. v.
State Dep't of Fish & Game, 17 Utah 2d 237, 408 P.2d 707 (1965); West Va. Dep't of
Highways v. Farmer, 159 W. Va. 823, 226 S.E.2d 717 (1976); see also Bumpus v. United
States, 325 F.2d 264, 266, 267 (10th Cir. 1963) (determining as matter of federal law
and according to "the applicable principles of general law" that "other minerals" does
not include gravel).
18 See, e.g., Wuf, 211 Kan. at 726, 731, 508 P.2d at 899, 902 (lease of "gas, petro-
leum, and other mineral substances" did not include coal, clay, gypsum, limestone,
gravel, rock, dirt, and clay-like materials); Keller v. Ely, 192 Kan. 698, 699, 391 P.2d 132,
133 (1964) (reservation of "oil, gas, casing-head gas and other liquids semi-solid and
solid minerals" held not to include gypsum); West, 536 P.2d at 397 ("oil, gas, and other
minerals" held not to include copper, silver, gold, or other metallic minerals).
19 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676 (1922).
20 Id. at 199, 91 So. at 677.
21 See Waugh v. Thompson Land & Coal Co., 103 W. Va. 567, 572, 137 S.E. 895,
897 (1927) ("oil and gas [are] hydrocarbons, and might be considered as minerals of like
kind and character as coal"). See also Shell Oil Co. v. Dye, 135 F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir.
1943) (rejecting ejusdem generis but noting that oil and coal are similar from chemical
[Vol. 71:618622
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resource.
23
As a formulation for determining unspecified minerals, ejusdem
generis fails to serve the two goals of "other minerals" determina-
tions. First, the doctrine fosters uncertainty and instability in land
titles. Title readers cannot predict with certainty which characteris-
tic of the enumerated minerals a court will select to determine sub-
stances qualifying as "other minerals." Thus, ejusdem generis
makes it "impossible to determine, with certainty, ihe extent of the
estate reserved, or conveyed, from the face of the document. '24
Courts have expressed their frustration with attempting to draw
from the enumerated minerals a single characteristic on which to
base their determinations. 25 This difficulty has prompted some
standpoint); Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 549 (N.D. 1973) (same); Western
Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 117, 288 P.2d 452, 455 (1955) (same).
22 See, e.g., Federal Gas, Oil & Coal Co. v. Moore, 290 Ky. 284, 287-89, 161 S.W.2d
46, 48 (1941) (oil and gas included in "coal salt-water and minerals" because of com-
mon knowledge that oil is usually produced with or near salt water); Huie Hodge Lumber
Co., 151 La. at 199, 91 So. at 677 (oil and gas not included in "iron, coal, and other
minerals" because they require different method of production). Cf. Besing v. Ohio Val-
ley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 535, 293 N.E.2d 510, 514 (1973) ("other minerals"
include substances "produced as a component or constituent of" enumerated minerals
from same mine or well as enumerated minerals).
23 A number of courts, although not applying ejusdem generis themselves, have
noted use as a relevant characteristic of the enumerated minerals to be considered in
ejusdem generis analysis. See, e.g., Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 441 F.2d 704,
713-14 (10th Cir. 1971) (noting argument that principal use of natural gas has been for
fuel, but refusing to exclude helium from gas lease); Shell Oil Co., 135 F.2d at 368 (re-
jecting ejusdem generis and holding oil included in "coal and other minerals," but stat-
ing that oil and coal are both primarily used for fuel); Christman v. Emineth, 212
N.W.2d 543, 549 (N.D. 1973) (not applying ejusdem generis, but holding coal included
in "oil, gas, and other minerals" and noting similarity between coal, oil, and gas as to
use).
24 Note, Ownership of Unspecified Minerals in Texas and Oklahoma After Reed v. Wylie II,
16 TULSA L.J. 511, 521 (1981).
Other limits to ejusdem generis make the rule difficult to apply in certain situations.
Courts have limited the doctrine to instruments enumerating more than one mineral on
the basis that determining the character of "other minerals" requires an enumeration of
several specified minerals. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co., 135 F.2d at 368 ("all the coal and other
minerals" does not enumerate particular minerals from which general term "and other
minerals" could draw its character). In addition, some courts have limited use of the
doctrine where other provisions of the instrument, such as a provision for payment of
royalties, explicitly include substances that application of ejusdem generis would ex-
clude. In these cases the specific language of the instrument is controlling. E.g., Mac-
Master v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36, 41-42 (N.D. 1957) (holding provision for payment of
royalty on sulphur indicated sulphur included and stating that where ejusdem generis
applied, classification must be broad enough to include all minerals specifically men-
tioned in lease).
25 See Shell Oil Co., 135 F.2d at 368 (criticizing application of ejusdem generis be-
cause "it is predicated upon a single physical characteristic to the exclusion of all
others"); Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 117, 288 P.2d 452, 455 (1955)
(courts have rejected application of ejusdem generis because they are "unable to deter-
mine whether the classification of the minerals granted should be approached from the
view of use, physical characteristics, or value"); see also Note, Beneath the Surface-Destruction
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courts to dismiss ejusdem generis as an "unsafe guide" for the inter-
pretation of "other minerals." 26
Ejusdem generis also fails to meet the goal of fairness. It has
the potential to damage the financial interests of the surface owner
if a court rules that a near-surface mineral belongs to the mineral
estate without providing special compensation to the surface owner
for the damages to his estate. Likewise, the interests of the mineral
owner are vulnerable because a court may rule that some substance
generally considered a mineral is not included in the mineral estate.
Thus, the mineral owner might lose a mineral that he could have
reasonably anticipated as included in the "other minerals" he
owned.
B. Destruction of the Surface Estate
When extracting a disputed mineral substance would destroy or
substantially damage the surface estate, courts may apply the sur-
face destruction test to exclude the substance from a grant or reser-
vation of "other minerals." 27 The test excludes all substances that
"must be removed by methods that will, in effect, consume or de-
Test. The Dialectic of Intention and Policy, 56 TEx. L. REv. 99, 101 (1977) ("The difficulty
with the rule is determining which characteristics of the substances specifically named
are relevant for defining the general term .... ").
26 E.g., Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096, 1099 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919,
writ refd). The court rejected ejusdem generis and interpreted a reservation of all the
"coal and mineral[s]" to include oil and gas. Id. at 1096. The court refused to accept
ejusdem generis because it was unable to select a single characteristic of the enumerated
mineral, coal, to apply to the minerals at issue, oil and gas. Id. at 1099. The court
explained that coal and oil are similar in value, use, and nature of origin, but dissimilar
in form, as coal is solid and oil is liquid. Id.
The Texas courts have generally rejected the use of ejusdem generis to determine
unspecified minerals, for the reasons stated in Luse. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 384,
349-50 (Tex. 1971) (rejecting ejusdem generis and lower court's application of doctrine,
but affirming on other grounds); Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp.,
378 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Tex. 1964) (reversing lower court application of ejusdem generis
and stating that "the doctrine of ejusdem generis as applied to minerals has never been
accepted in this state"). But see Fleming Found. v. Texaco, 337 S.W.2d 846, 851-52
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ refd n.r.e.) (applying ejusdem generis and hold-
ing that reservation of "oil, gas, and other minerals" did not include subsurface water).
27 See, e.g., Pariani v. State, 105 Cal. App. 3d 923, 933, 164 Cal. Rptr. 683, 688
(1980) (geothermal resources included in mineral reservation when development had
"not significantly affected the beneficial use of the land surface"); Holloway Gravel Co.
v. McKowen, 200 La. 917, 931, 9 So. 2d 228, 233 (1942) ("It would not be reasonable to
construe the reservation of 'mineral, oil and gas rights' so as to embrace the right to
exploit minerals which could not be removed from the land without destroying its sur-
face for agricultural and grazing purposes."); Christensen v. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 99
Nev. 34, 37, 656 P.2d 844, 847 (1983) (title to minerals vests in surface owner unless
mineral owner "can remove the minerals in question by methods of extraction which will
not consume, deplete or destroy the surface estate"); West Va. Dep't of Highways v.
Farmer, 226 S.E.2d 717, 719 (W. Va. 1976) (sand and gravel not included in "oil, gas,
and other minerals" because their recovery would destroy the land's surface).
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plete the surface estate" 28 from the "other minerals." Widely ap-
plied in Texas, 29 the test was criticized by commentators 0 and was
finally rejected in Moser.31
The surface destruction test fails to meet the two goals of lend-
ing stability and certainty to land tides and providing a fair accom-
28 Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971). As with the other traditional
formulations, courts generally apply the surface destruction test when construing am-
biguous instruments. But see Williford v. Spies, 530 S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1975, no writ) ("[Tihe term 'other minerals' is not ambiguous," and, unless the
instrument provides otherwise, "minerals that must be strip mined belong to the surface
estate.").
29 Texas adopted the surface destruction test in Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348
(Tex. 1971). Prior to Acker, Texas followed an ordinary and natural meaning test, see
infra section II F, to determine "other minerals," but considered surface destruction as a
factor in deciding such questions. Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 518-19, 217 S.W.2d
994, 998 (1949).
Acker quoted and purported to follow the theory of Professor Kuntz, see supra notes
10, 12 and infra section III B. Under the Kuntz theory a grant or reservation of "other
minerals" would effect a total severance of the minerals from the surface. The surface
owner would then, according to Kuntz, receive compensation for damages to the sur-
face. See Kuntz, supra note 10, at 113. The Acker court actually reached a result contrary
to the Kuntz approach. Kuntz would not restrict ownership but would place restrictions
only on the manner of taking the mineral by requiring compensation to the surface
owner for "unreasonable injury." Id. Acker, on the other hand, restricted the ownership
of the mineral by excluding specific substances that would cause surface destruction
when extracted.
The Texas surface destruction test was refined in two subsequent cases. Reed v.
Wylie, 554 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. 1977) (Reed I); Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980)
(Reed II). In Reed I the court explicitly reaffirmed Acker and held that the surface owner
in an "other minerals" dispute must prove that, "as of the date of the instrument being
construed, if the substance near the surface had been extracted, that extraction would
necessarily have consumed or depleted the land surface." Reed I, 554 S.W.2d at 172.
This created a requirement of proof that surface destructive methods were the only
methods of removal available. The court also found that once an instrument had been
interpreted to exclude a near-surface substance, that same substance was excluded at all
depths. Id.
In Reed II, the court defined a near-surface mineral as one within 200 feet of the
surface and overruled part of Reed I by requiring only that any reasonable method of re-
moval, not the only method available, would cause surface destruction. Reed II, 597
S.W.2d at 747-48. Reed II also overruled the requirement that the methods of extraction
used as of the date of the instrument determined the extent of surface destruction. Id.
The test articulated in Reed II was that if a deposit lies near the surface the substance will
not be granted or retained as a mineral if any reasonable method of production would
destroy or deplete the surface. Id.
30 See, e.g., Maxwell, The Meaning of "Minerals"-The Relationship of Interpretation and
Surface Burden, 8 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 255, 287 (1976) ("certainty and orderly develop-
ment would be enhanced by the rejection of theAcker approach"); Reeves, supra note 11,
at 435, 438 (Acker rule "contains enough mischief to provide employment for several
generations of Texas real property and mineral lawyers"); Note, supra note 6, at 868
(calling Acker "springboard of confusion"). See also Reed I, 554 S.W.2d at 178 (DanielJ.,
dissenting) (predicting majority approach would lead to "ownership uncertainties" and
"inequities").
31 Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) ("We now
abandon.. . the Acker and Reed approach to determining ownership of 'other minerals'
.... "). See infra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
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modation of the parties' interests. The test makes land titles
uncertain because courts and other title interpreters must make nu-
merous factual determinations to determine the unspecified miner-
als.32 Applying this analysis, courts must determine whether a
particular substance rests near the surface and what methods of pro-
duction were available to extract the substance at a certain date,
either the date when the instrument was construed, or possibly
when the instrument was executed.3 3 Application of the test could
require that title to a substance change ownership if development of
a new method of production permitted the extraction of the sub-
stance without surface destruction. This "passage of title by tech-
nology" creates uncertainty by making land titles dependent upon
constant technological advances in the field of mineral pro-
duction.3 4
The surface destruction test fails to meet the goal of fair accom-
modation of the interests of the parties by unjustly enriching the
surface owner to the detriment of the mineral owner.35 The parties
to the original conveyance of "other minerals" may have expected
to include in the mineral owner's estate substances objectively con-
sidered "minerals." However, courts excluding a substance from
"other minerals" based on the surface destruction test award the
surface owner title to a "mineral." Consequently, the surface owner
may mine or develop the mineral even after conveying "other min-
erals" to the mineral owner. The test's emphasis on preventing de-
struction to the surface owner's estate thus yields added benefits to
the surface owner, who may receive title to valuable minerals, and
financial loss to the mineral owner, who cannot develop substances
that he reasonably may have expected to come within his estate as
"other minerals."
32 Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 101. See also Reed II, 597 S.W.2d at 750 (Spears,J., concur-
ring) (noting fact issues that must be resolved under surface destruction test and stating
need for new rule that would be fair and lend stability to land titles); Note, supra note 25,
at 108 ("That it creates undue uncertainty of mineral titles is the most common attack
on the surface-destruction test.").
33 See the discussion of the evolution of the surface destruction test in Texas, supra
note 29.
34 Patton, Recent Changes in the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Owners, 18
RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 19, 25-26 (1973) (articulating how passage of title by technol-
ogy could occur and stating that concept "could lead to premature grayness in a title
examiner").
35 See Note, Surface or Mineral. A Single Test?, 23 BAYLOR L. Rav. 407, 416 (1971)
("The surface should be compensated or in some way protected, but it should not reap
an increment in value merely because the destruction of the surface would result if the
substance were extracted by presently known methods."); Comment, Is Coal Included in a
Grant or Reservation of "Oil, Gas, or Other Ainerals"?, 30 Sw. LJ. 481, 500 (1976) ("As a
result of an enthusiasm to protect the surface estate from any damage, the court has
conferred upon the surface owner a valuable mineral deposit and left the mineral owner
with nothing.").
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C. Common Recognition as a Mineral in the Locale
Another approach available to courts interpreting an ambigu-
ous instrument containing an "other minerals" clause is to consider
whether the substance at issue was commonly recognized as a min-
eral in the area at the time of the instrument's execution.3 6 This
"rule of contemporaneous construction" is often called the
"Strohacker doctrine," after the Arkansas case of Missouri Pacific Rail-
road v. Strohacker.37
In Strohacker the court found that the phrase "all coal and min-
eral deposits" did not reserve title to oil and gas because at the time
of the deed's execution those substances were not commonly recog-
nized in the area as minerals 38 and "were not given the slightest
commercial consideration in connection with land values." 39 The
"other minerals" clause could have included oil and gas only "[i]f
the reservations had been made at a time when oil and gas produc-
tion, or exploration, were general, and legal or commercial usage
had assumed them to be within the term 'minerals.'"40 Arkansas
courts frequently invoke the Strohacker approach to determine
"other minerals" questions.41
The Strohacker doctrine fails to meet either goal of formulations
to determine "other minerals." The test fails to provide stability
and certainty in land titles because, like the surface destruction
test,42 the Stohacker approach requires special factual inquiries that
may vary among cases. A court or title examiner attempting to in-
terpret an "other minerals" clause under this test must resort to his-
36 See cases cited infra note 41 (Arkansas Supreme Court's approach); see also West-
ern Coal & Mining Co. v. Middleton, 362 F.2d 48, 52 (8th Cir. 1966) (affirming finding
from exhibits that common or commercial usage of "other minerals" in Sebastian
County, Arkansas, in 1904 did not include oil and gas); Singleton v. Missouri Pac. R.R.,
205 F. Supp. 113, 115-17 (E.D. Ark. 1962) (reservation of "all minerals" included oil
and gas in deed conveying land in area in which oil and gas activity was present prior to
execution of deed); Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Lands Co., 151 La. 197, 199,
91 So. 676, 677 (1922) ("we should consider the conditions and circumstances sur-
rounding the parties at the time"); Deer Lake Co. v. Michigan Land & Iron Co., 89 Mich.
180, 186, 50 N.W. 807, 809 (1891) ("they could have only meant ... mines and ores of
metals and minerals in common use, and commonly known as such").
37 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941).
38 Id. at 656, 152 S.W.2d at 563.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 650-51, 152 S.W.2d at 561.
41 See, e.g., Ahne v. Reinhart & Donovan Co., 240 Ark. 691, 695, 401 S.W.2d 565,
568 (1966) (finding deed conveying "coal, oil and mineral" to include gas where gas was
commonly recognized mineral in area at time of deed execution); Stegall v. Bugh, 228
Ark. 632, 633-34, 310 S.W.2d 251, 252-53 (1958) (reservation of "mineral interest in
said lands" did not include oil and gas because in 1900 oil and gas were not considered
"minerals" in area); Brizzolara v. Powell, 214 Ark. 870, 873, 218 S.W.2d 728, 729 (1949)
(Strohacker "has become a rule of property").
42 See supra section II B.
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torical resources and other research material to determine whether
the substance at issue was generally recognized as a mineral in the
area at the time of the original instrument. This approach unduly
burdens courts by requiring them to determine the dates on which
individual substances became generally recognized as minerals43 in
individual geographic areas.44
Moreover, refusing to include an undiscovered or unknown
mineral in a grant or reservation fails to accommodate fairly the par-
ties' interests. For example, in Stegall v. Bugh45 the court excluded
oil and gas from a reservation despite evidence that traces of oil had
appeared on freshwater springs on or near the property in question.
In addition, the grantor had apparently reserved the mineral inter-
est with oil and gas specifically in mind.46 This application of the
Strohacker rule gave the surface owner a windfall in the form of oil
and gas rights and disregarded the parties' interests in the use of
their respective estates. 47 Some courts have expressed dissatisfac-
tion with the assertion that absence of local development of a min-
eral is sufficient to exclude it from an instrument with an "other
minerals" clause.48 These courts argue that "the mere fact that a
particular mineral had not been discovered in that vicinity would
43 Furthermore, even a court decision about when a certain substance was generally
recognized as a mineral may not improve stability. Historical information is always sub-
ject to change because of the possible revelation of other historical data, which may cast
uncertainty on the durability of court decisions.
44 A dissenter in several of the most recent Arkansas Supreme Court cases follow-
ing Strohacker argued that the court, in following Strohacker, was proceeding on a county-
by-county basis to determine when oil and gas became recognized as minerals. The
dissenter proposed that the court should declare that byJanuary 1, 1900, oil was gener-
ally considered and understood to be a mineral. Ahne v. Reinhart & Donovan Co., 240
Ark. 691, 700, 401 S.W.2d 565, 570 (1966) (McFaddin, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Stegall v. Bugh, 228 Ark. 632, 636, 310 S.W.2d 251, 254 (1958) (Mc-
Faddin, J., dissenting).
45 228 Ark. 632, 310 S.W.2d 251 (1958).
46 Id. at 633, 637, 310 S.W.2d at 252, 254. The grantor recognized oil as a mineral,
discussed with other persons the possibility of oil and gas production in the area, and
told the grantee that he wanted to reserve the oil. He also put forth extra effort in
finding someone to draft the mineral reservation. Id.
47 Relying on a federal court interpretation of the Strohacker approach, Thomas v.
Markham & Brown, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 498, 501 (E.D. Ark. 1973), the Arkansas court has
ruled that a substance will not necessarily constitute a mineral even though its presence,
value, and uses are well known. Southern Title Ins. Co. v. Oller, 268 Ark. 300, 303, 595
S.W.2d 681, 683 (1980) ("the fact that it is well known that a valuable substance is in or
on the ground does not necessarily make the substance a 'mineral' within a mineral
grant or reservation").
48 See, e.g., Maynard v. McHenry, 271 Ky. 642, 645, 113 S.W.2d 13, 14 (1938)
("mere fact that a particular mineral has not been discovered in the vicinity of the land
conveyed or is unknown at the time the deed is executed" does not prevent mineral
from being included in deed); see also Reeves, supra note 11, at 457-59 & n.269 (citing
cases).
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not preclude the granting of rights to such a mineral." 49
D. Knowledge of the Parties as to the Presence of a Mineral
Some courts look to the knowledge of the parties with respect
to the substance at issue when deciding "other minerals" ques-
tions.50 These courts will exclude from a grant or reservation of
"other minerals" substances that the parties did not know existed. 51
When a substance does not come within "other minerals," title to
that substance either remains with the surface owner, in the case of a
conveyance of the mineral rights, or passes to the new surface
owner, in the case of a sale of the surface subject to a reservation of
mineral rights. This narrow approach focuses on the subjective in-
tent of the parties, instead of the objective historical factors consid-
ered under the Strohacker rule.52 When applying the approach,
courts must investigate the parties' specific thoughts, not by implica-
tion as with the other traditional formulations, but by direct inquiry
into their knowledge at the time they granted, reserved, or conveyed
a mineral interest.
Relying on the knowledge of the parties, however, does not ful-
fill the goal of title certainty. The test has utility only if neither party
possesses any knowledge of the substance at issue and that lack of
knowledge is readily discernible. In those cases the lack of knowl-
edge easily allows a court to exclude the substance from the grant or
reservation. The test, however, does not apply with similar ease to
most other situations. In a jurisdiction following this formulation,
courts and title interpreters must inquire into the parties' thoughts
and expectations at the time of the instrument's execution. Arbi-
trary judgments may occur where parties suspected the presence of
a mineral but possessed no definite knowledge of it. Furthermore,
49 Western Dev. Co. v. Nell, 4 Utah 2d 112, 116-17, 288 P.2d 452, 455 (1955).
50 See McKinney's Heirs v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, 120 S.W. 314
(1909) (natural gas not included in mineral grant where court found no intent to include
it); Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co., 310 Ill. 126, 141 N.E. 537 (1923) (gran-
tor of mineral rights did not intend to convey limestone where conveyance would de-
stroy his surface estates); Detlor v. Holland, 57 Ohio St. 492, 502, 49 N.E. 690, 692
(1898) (oil not included in "other valuable minerals" where neither party knew of its
existence); Dunham & Shortt v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36 (1882) (oil not included in in-
strument where parties did not intend to include it and probably did not know of its
existence).
51 See, e.g., McKinney's Heirs, 134 Ky. at 248, 120 S.W. at 317; Detlor, 57 Ohio St. at
502, 49 N.E. at 692.
52 The Strohacker approach could be categorized as a branch of the "knowledge of
the parties" method. Courts using Strohacker simply impute knowledge to the parties
upon a finding of mineral development in the locale based on historical evidence. The
courts rejecting the Strohacker approach and taking a more literal reading of "other min-
erals" would also reject dependence on the actual knowledge of the parties. See cases
cited supra notes 48-49.
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the test does not easily apply where one party knew of the existence
of a mineral but the other party had absolutely no knowledge. In
such cases, the parties have no unanimity of intent,53 and courts
cannot reasonably interpret the "other minerals" language by rely-
ing on the parties' unequal knowledge.
This formulation also fails to fulfill the goal of fairly accommo-
dating the interests of the parties. When the surface owner has con-
veyed "other minerals," the knowledge of the parties formulation
restrains the mineral owner from developing an unspecified mineral
unless the mineral owner and the surface owner knew of the min-
eral's existence. Otherwise, the surface owner will retain the rights
to the mineral which he may then develop or sell. Additionally, in
cases where the mineral owner, as a grantee, knew of a mineral and
the surface owner, as grantor, had no such knowledge, a court at-
tempting to apply the test would likely exclude the mineral from
"other minerals" because the parties lacked unanimity of knowl-
edge. The surface owner, retaining title to the mineral, would be
enriched, and the mineral owner would suffer a loss to the extent
that he could not develop a mineral that he had knowledge of when
he obtained the mineral interest. The net benefits under this test
would generally accrue to surface owners, who would have title to
all unknown minerals discovered subsequent to a mineral grant or
reservation. Mineral owners could only protect their interests in fu-
ture discoveries by having the instruments drafted to include "other
minerals, known and unknown" or by disclosing their knowledge of
a substance to the surface owner, with the result that the surface
owner would then demand a greater price for a mineral interest.
E. Circumstances Surrounding the Mineral
Grant or Reservation
Some courts take a broad view of the general circumstances sur-
rounding the agreement. These courts adopt a less restrictive ap-
proach than Strohacker, which admits extrinsic evidence only as to
the general recognition of a substance at the date of the instrument.
In determining "other minerals" questions these courts take into
account extrinsic circumstances such as the business positions or
other relationships of the parties, 54 any existing production or de-
53 See McKinneys Heirs, 134 Ky. at 242, 120 S.W. at 315 ("But the question to be
determined is: What was the intention of the parties to the deeds at the times they were
made? . . . Did the one understand that he was conveying, and the other that he was
purchasing, the gas thereunder?").
54 See Besing v. Ohio Valley Coal Co., 155 Ind. App. 527, 532-33, 293 N.E.2d 510,
513 (1973) (coal not included in "oil, gas and other minerals" when party engaged in oil
business did not deal with coal); Hans v. Great Bend Brick & Tile Co., 172 Kan. 478,
483, 241 P.2d 475, 478 (1952) (noting that "relative positions of the parties interested"
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velopment on the property at issue, 55 and the general "preoccupa-
tion" of the parties with a particular substance. 56
Considering extrinsic evidence of circumstances surrounding
the execution of an instrument fails to promote title stability and
certainty or accommodate the interests of the parties. The test con-
tributes to title instability and uncertainty because title readers can
never predict with certainty, or interpret with confidence, the factors
a court will select for examination. 57 Furthermore, interpretation in
the courts is difficult. For example, courts that consider the busi-
ness of the parties as a factor might have to determine what percent-
age of a business is sufficiently significant to affect an interpretation
of "other minerals." Difficult fact determinations render the parties
and other title readers unable to predict a court's conclusion.
The consideration of evidence of surrounding circumstances
causes unfairness in accommodating the interests of the parties
when a court considers circumstances that the parties never in-
tended to affect their relationship. For example, when courts rely
on evidence of the parties' principal business activity, a coal pro-
ducer who obtained "other minerals" with the undisclosed intent of
moving into the oil and gas business could lose that portion of his
mineral interest. Similarly, the surrounding circumstances test
could also disadvantage the surface owner. Because the courts
alone choose the circumstances and assess their importance, a court
could include a mineral that the parties had not intended to convey
or reserve. If removal of that mineral caused surface destruction,
the surface owner would suffer an unanticipated loss.
In applying the surrounding circumstances test, some courts
also will examine the instrument in its entirety by looking beyond
should be taken into account; both were dealing with oil and gas, so clay deposits not
included); Witherspoon v. Campbell, 219 Miss. 640, 646, 69 So. 2d 384, 386 (1954)
(stating that consideration must be given to situation of parties and their businesses and
noting that gravel did not constitute "other mineral" because grantor had no use for
gravel at time of conveyance); see also Reeves, supra note 11, at 457.
55 See Wulf v. Shultz, 211 Kan. 724, 726-28, 508 P.2d 896, 899-900 (1973) (noting
that active oil and gas wells stood on property at date of lease of "natural gas, petro-
leum, and other mineral substances," and finding coal, clay, limestone, gravel, and other
material not included).
56 See Besing, 155 Ind. App. at 533, 293 N.E.2d at 513 ("the parties to the convey-
ance were preoccupied with oil and gas"); Wulf 211 Kan. at 727, 508 P.2d at 900 ("the
entire lease is couched in terms of oil and gas, those substances dominating the atten-
tion of the parties"); Patterson v. Wilcox, 11 Utah 2d 264, 265-266, 358 P.2d 88, 90
(1961) (holding grant of "all mineral rights" limited to uranium-like ores where area
involved was one of "intense activity in staking claims and searching for [uranium]" and
negotiations over transaction involved "nothing but uranium potentials").
57 Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. 1984) (title uncer-
tainty occurs when ownership of minerals cannot be determined from grant or reserva-
tion alone).
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the provisions of the mineral grant or reservation. These courts will
consider matters such as the form or tide of the instrument, 58 spe-
cific provisions of the instrument regarding royalties or existing de-
velopment on the land,59 and the general purpose or subject matter
of the agreement.60 The consideration of other circumstances
within the agreement itself is a more reliable means of deciding the
"other minerals" question. However, it still requires a title reader
to examine the terms of the instrument beyond the mineral grant or
reservation itself and to predict a judicial interpretation of those
terms. For maximum stability and certainty of titles and fairness to
the parties' interests, a reading of the provisions of the mineral
grant or reservation should suffice to determine the ownership of
unspecified minerals.
F. Ordinary and Natural Meaning
The ordinary and natural meaning formulation examines only
whether the substance at issue constitutes a mineral. If the sub-
stance is a mineral, it automatically comes within an "other miner-
als" clause. 6' Courts applying the test must determine whether
knowledgeable individuals ordinarily and naturally consider the
substance a mineral according to common recognition or general
understanding. 62 The other traditional formulations differ from the
58 See Wulf 211 Kan. at 727, 508 P.2d at 900 (noting importance of fact that original
parties to lease designated it an "oil and gas lease").
59 See id. at 729, 508 P.2d at 900-01 (discussing portion of instrument at issue that
permitted party to remove "buildings, machinery, pipelines, casing and tubing" and
stating that these items were commonly found on oil and gas operations but were not
used for removal of other mineral substances); MacMaster v. Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36, 41
(N.D. 1957) (provision in instrument for payment of royalty on sulphur indicated that
this substance was to be included in "all other minerals"); Patterson v. Wilcox, 11 Utah
2d 264, 266, 358 P.2d 88, 90 (1961) (oil and gas excluded where instrument was typical
of those for uranium production and provided for work methods and royalty payment
typical to ore mining).
60 See Davis v. Plunkett, 187 Kan. 121, 124, 353 P.2d 514, 516 (1960) (oil and gas
excluded where "primary object" and "subject matter" of instrument were volcanic ash
and gypsum); Hans v. Great Bend Brick & Tile Co., 172 Kan. 478, 483, 241 P.2d 475,
478 (1952) ("the substance of the transaction which the instrument embodies must be
taken into account"); Dawson v. Meike, 508 P.2d 15, 18 (Wyo. 1973) ("court should
consider not only the terms of the writing but also the surrounding circumstances").
61 The ordinary and natural meaning approach applies to instruments that are un-
ambiguous in the sense that they embrace all "minerals," specified or otherwise. Thus,
the ordinary and natural meaning test only determines what substances are considered
"minerals." See Schreier v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 96 Ill. App. 2d 425,431-32, 239 N.E.2d
281, 284 (1968) (because terms in deed followed settled legal meaning, court could not
construe them otherwise through resort to extrinsic evidence); Maynard v. McHenry,
271 Ky. 642, 644, 113 S.W.2d 13, 14 (1938) ("The deed is not so ambiguous as to
authorize resort to extrinsic evidence as an aid to its construction."); Heinatz v. Allen,
147 Tex. 512, 514, 217 S.W.2d 994, 995 (1949) ("intention .. is to be ascertained
without aid from evidence as to the attending circumstance").
62 See Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368, 373, 270 P.2d 190, 193 (1954) (" 'the true test
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ordinary and natural meaning approach by assuming that the sub-
stance at issue is a mineral, and then shifting the focus to whether
the substance comes within the "other minerals" clause.
Some courts have attempted to clarify the interpretation of the
phrase "ordinary and natural meaning." In Heinatz v. Allen,63 a
Texas court stated that a substance would not constitute a mineral
within the ordinary and natural meaning unless it was "rare and ex-
ceptional in character or possess[ed] a peculiar property giving [it]
special value." 64 According to the court, sand valuable for making
glass or limestone suitable for manufacture into cement would suf-
fice as minerals, but substances "useful only for building and road-
making purposes, are not regarded as minerals in the ordinary and
generally accepted meaning of the word." 65 Other courts applying
an ordinary and natural meaning test have stated it variously as
"usual and ordinary sense," 66 "plain and ordinary meaning," 67 and
"ordinary popular sense." 68
The ordinary and natural meaning test facilitates stability of
land titles. 69 Unlike the other traditional formulations, the ordinary
and natural meaning approach requires few factual determina-
tions.70 The approach demands only that the title reader interpret
an instrument according to the ordinary understanding that attaches
is what ["mineral"] means in the vernacular of the mining world, the commercial world
and landowners at the time of the grant, and whether the particular substance was so
regarded as a mineral' ") (quoting Waring v. Foden, [1932] 1 Ch. 276, 294); Mack Oil
Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955, 961 (Okla. 1964) ("determination ... must turn upon
what the word. . . ordinarily is understood to mean in the meaning and intention (ver-
nacular) of the particular industry, the commercial world and the landowners").
Courts use the ordinary and natural meaning test to limit the broader scientific and
technical definitions of substances as minerals. See, e.g., Farrell v. Sayre, 129 Colo. 368,
270 P.2d 190 (1954); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949); Puget Mill
Co. v. Duecy, 1 Wash. 2d 421, 96 P.2d 571 (1939). The scientific or geological defini-
tion would include many substances that the parties likely did not intend to convey. One
court noted that "the scientific or technical definition of minerals is so broad as to em-
brace not only metallic minerals, oil, gas, stone, sand, gravel and many other substances,
but even the soil itself. . . . [I]t is rare, if ever, that mineral is intended in the scientific
or geological sense in the ordinary trading transactions about which deeds and contracts
are made." Heinatz, 147 Tex. at 517, 217 S.W.2d at 997. Cf. New Mexico & Ariz. Land
Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp. 767, 771 (D.N.M.), appeal dismissed, 239 F.2d 645 (10th Cir.
1956) (arguably combining scientific definition and ordinary meaning into single test).
63 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949).
64 Id. at 518, 217 S.W.2d at 997. The court excluded limestone from the testamen-
tary conveyance, finding that it was not a mineral because it had value only for building
purposes. Id.
65 Id.
66 Lambert v. Pritchett, 284 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Ky. 1955).
67 Burdette v. Bruen, 118 W. Va. 624, 628, 191 S.E. 360, 361 (1937).
68 Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 198, 62 A. 832, 833 (1906).
69 See Patterson, supra note 9, at 21-34 (noting enhancement of title stability with
strict ordinary and natural meaning approach).
70 See supra text accompanying notes 19-23, 32-33, 42-44, 52-53, 57.
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to a certain substance. 71 More efficient and consistent determina-
tions of land titles result because the courts' factual determinations
remain more reliable over time. 72 Once a substance is held to be a
mineral, it will remain so. As new substances are discovered or be-
come valuable, individual title readers will be able to ascertain
whether they are generally considered minerals, and eventually
courts will make the determinations for all substances in dispute.
The consequences of the ordinary and natural meaning formu-
lation, however, may fall too harshly on the surface owner. The dis-
covery of some substance that becomes popularly recognized as a
mineral 73 and must be removed by surface destructive means could
leave the landowner with surface damage he had never anticipated.
Land sales subject to mineral reservations may not account for the
cost of potential surface damage from future discovery of substances
that become recognized as minerals. Similarly, the landowner who
sells his mineral rights cannot calculate the value of an unknown
mineral, or the damage to his surface estate from that mineral's ex-
traction. In each case the surface owner suffers a financial disadvan-
tage which accrues to the benefit of the mineral owner. The surface
owner may, of course, bring an action for damages,7 4 but the incon-
venience and expense of suing may cause him to forfeit his rights.
Thus, courts adopting an ordinary and natural meaning test should
71 Although the courts must determine whether individual substances come within
the ordinary and natural meaning of "minerals," their determinations are not in the
nature of the factual inquiries based on historical data, expert testimony, inquiries into a
party's knowledge or intent, and other evidence required by the traditional formula-
tions. A court applying the ordinary and natural meaning test need only discern the
general understanding that persons in a given area have toward the substance.
A judicial determination that a substance constitutes a mineral within the term's
ordinary and natural meaning gives greater stability to titles because courts need make
such a determination only once. In contrast, determinations under the other traditional
formulations may need revision as technology develops or other circumstances are
changed. Furthermore, because an ordinary and natural meaning determination simply
gauges the general attitude or sense toward a substance, the results of court decisions
applying the test should prove more predictable. In most cases little controversy will
surround the determination of whether a substance is a mineral.. The ordinary sense
that exists toward a certain substance may, of course, change over time, but the change
would not be abrupt and should be apparent to observers. This ability to anticipate
change would maintain title stability. Stability will allow parties to act with greater confi-
dence concerning substances not yet subject to formal judicial evaluation.
72 See supra note 71.
73 For example, in New Mexico & Ariz. Land Co. v. Elkins, 137 F. Supp. 767
(D.N.M.), appeal dismissed, 239 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1956), the court decided that uranium,
first discovered in the area in 1950, was included in a 1946 deed reserving "minerals."
Id. at 768, 773. Prior to the uranium discovery, the substance "had no commercial value
in that locality" and was "not known to exist in that part of New Mexico." Id. at 769.
74 See id. at 773 (holding uranium included in "oil, gas and minerals," but "reserv-
ing to the defendants . . . their. . . causes of action against the plaintiffs for any dam-
ages resulting to their estate as now delineated, from any activities of the plaintiffs in
connection with the exploration and mining of minerals").
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realize that although the approach lends stability to land titles, it
does not fairly accommodate the interests of the parties. 75
III
THE MOSER APPROACH TO DETERMINING
UNSPECIFIED MINERALS
In Moser v. United States Steel Corp.76 the Texas Supreme Court
refused to apply the surface destruction test that it had carefully de-
veloped since 1971. 77 Instead, the court adopted a new test pat-
terned closely after the "manner of enjoyment" formulation
advanced by Professor Kuntz. 78 The court's variation on the Kuntz
test satisfies the two goals of a formulation to determine "other min-
erals" questions: title stability and fairness.
A. Background
Prior to Moser, Texas courts determined "other minerals" ques-
tions by applying the surface destruction test first advanced by the
Texas Supreme Court in Acker v. Guinn. 79 In Acker, the court stated
that "a grant or reservation of 'minerals' or 'mineral rights' should
not be construed to include a substance that must be removed by
methods that will, in effect, consume or deplete the surface es-
tate." 80 Thus, prior to Moser, Texas courts refused to include in an
"other minerals" clause a substance that by any reasonable method
of production would destroy or deplete the surface. 81
The dispute in Moser concerned whether a reservation of "oil,
gas and other minerals" included uranium.82 The plaintiff surface
75 Commentators have criticized the ordinary and natural meaning approach for its
harshness to the interests of surface owners. Patterson, supra note 9, at 21-34 ("The
result in the Elkins case may seem harsh .... "); Note, Real Property: Construction of Deeds:
Reservation of "Oil, Gas, and Minerals" Includes Uranium Ores, 3 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 613, 615
(1956) (commenting that Elkins "arrives at a harsh result and one which the transaction,
taken as a whole, shows could not have been intended").
On the other hand, because it avoids scientific or geological definitions, see supra
note 62, the approach may benefit surface owners by excluding substances associated
with the land's surface, such as sand, gravel, and water.
76 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
77 See supra note 29. The court, however, did not abandon the surface destruction
test for all purposes. See infra notes 102, 107 and accompanying text.
78 See infra section III B.
79 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971). See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
80 464 S.W.2d at 352. See supra section II B.
81 Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 1980) (Reed II). See supra note 29.
82 Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 100. The 1949 deed at issue in Moser reserved
"all of the oil, gas, and other minerals of every kind and character, in, on,
under and that may be produced from said tract of land, together with all
necessary and convenient easements for the purpose of exploring for,
mining, drilling, producing and transporting oil, gas or any of said
minerals."
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owners sued the mineral owners to establish ownership of the ura-
nium. At trial, the court found that because extracting the uranium
would cause no substantial surface destruction, the uranium came
within the confines of the mineral estate.8 3 An intermediate appel-
late court affirmed the decision of the trial court.8 4 The Texas
Supreme Court could have affirmed the lower courts' applications of
the surface destruction test based on existing law. Instead, how-
ever, the court reexamined the test and the Acker court's adoption of
the reasoning of Professor Kuntz's "manner of enjoyment" test8 5
and forged a new formulation for interpreting "other minerals"
clauses.8 6
B. The Manner of Enjoyment Formulation
In an article discussing the problem of interpreting "minerals"
in deed clauses,8 7 Professor Eugene Kuntz advanced a formulation,
sometimes termed the "manner of enjoyment" test,8 8 for the devel-
oping mineral law of Wyoming. This approach enhances stability
and certainty of land titles and fairly accommodates the interests of
the parties.
Professor Kuntz asserted that the manner by which courts de-
ciding "other minerals" questions purported to arrive at the intent
of the parties was "completely unsatisfactory [as] demonstrated by
the variety of results which flow from it"89 and "completely without
value for use in the future in determining the character of sub-
stances which remain unknown or are presently considered to have
no intrinsic value." 90 He proposed an approach that searched for
the general intent of the parties rather than any specific intent as to
particular minerals. 91 Courts would determine general intent "by
considering the purposes of the grant or reservation in terms of man-
ner of enjoyment intended in the ensuing interests. ' 92 According to
Kuntz, "[t]he manner of enjoyment of the mineral estate is through
extraction of valuable substances, and the enjoyment of the surface
is through retention of such substances as are necessary for the use
Id.
83 Id.
84 Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 601 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1980), afd, 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984).
85 Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971) (quoting Kuntz test and stat-
ing that it is "entirely sound"). See supra note 29.
86 See infra section III C.
87 Kuntz, supra note 10.
88 Note, supra note 6, at 869.
89 Kuntz, supra note 10, at 112.
90 Id.
91 See supra note 12.
92 Kuntz, supra note 10, at 112 (emphasis in original).
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of the surface."193
Application of the Kuntz approach results in severing the entire
mineral estate from the surface estate where a general grant or res-
ervation of minerals lacks qualifying language. This approach, put
into practice, would "sever from the surface all substances presently
valuable in themselves, apart from the soil, whether their presence is
known or not, and all substances which become valuable through
development of the arts and sciences." 94 Kuntz limited the ap-
proach, however, by requiring that only substances removable with-
out unreasonable damage to the enjoyment of the surface estate or
interference with the uses of the land may be extracted without
compensation. 95
The Kuntz approach meets both of the goals for interpreting
"other minerals" clauses. First, it encourages stability and certainty
of land titles by completely severing the minerals from the surface.
Severing the two estates eliminates confusion over title to unspeci-
fied minerals. Tide readers interpreting a tide under this approach
know immediately, without looking beyond the words of the grant
or reservation itself, the extent of the mineral estate.96 The test ac-
commodates the passage of time and developmerit of technology,
because any new substance that is discovered or attains special value
simply becomes part of the mineral estate.97
This approach also equitably accommodates the parties' inter-
93 Id.
94 Id. at 113.
95 Id.
A number of courts have attempted to apply the Kuntz theory. See Amoco Prod. Co.
v. Guild Trust, 461 F. Supp. 279, 282-83 (D. Wyo. 1978), afl'd, 636 F.2d 261 (10th Cir.
1980); Pariani v. State, 105 Cal. App. 3d 923, 937, 164 Cal. Rptr. 683, 687 (1980); Spur-
lock v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 143 Ariz. 469, 478-79, 694 P.2d 299, 308-09 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1984); Storm Assocs., Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1982), aff'd sub nom. Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. 1985).
Their attempts, however, have sometimes produced results that are inconsistent with the
approach Professor Kuntz advocated. See Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971)
(attempting to follow Kuntz approach but actually reaching contrary result); Storm As-
socs., 645 S.W.2d at 584 (noting Acker's reference to Kuntz but excluding uranium from
"oil, gas, and other minerals"). See supra note 29.
96 See supra text accompanying note 94.
97 See Note, supra note 35, at 416 ("[Kuntz] approach leaves the definition of miner-
als open and retains a flexibility to provide the answer for any substance which is or
hereafter becomes valuable, whether by development of markets, science, or application
of technology."); Note, supra note 6, at 869 ("the flexibility of the manner of enjoyment
test may be its most attractive feature"). Note, however, that flexibility does not subject
the Kuntz approach to the "passage of title by technology" criticism of the surface de-
struction test, see supra note 34 and accompanying text. Under the surface destruction
test the technology may exist to produce a mineral, but title to the mineral does not pass
until a method of production that does not damage the surface becomes available.
Under Kuntz, every mineral passes to the mineral owner regardless of the difficulty of
extraction or the damage to the surface estate caused by extraction.
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ests.98 To mitigate the potential unfairness of including even miner-
als produced by surface destructive means, the approach requires
compensation for damage to the surface. Some commentators have
criticized the approach for resulting in a "forced sale of the surface
[estate]."99 Because all minerals are simply severed without further
inquiry, the surface owner has no choice in the matter. Moreover,
the approach may not satisfy the surface owner who wishes to pre-
serve the surface in its original form. The Kuntz approach is inade-
quate for a surface owner who desires to maintain certain aesthetic
or sentimental characteristics or uses of his property. However, the
Kuntz approach, and the traditional formulations as well, focus on
the compensable economic interests of the surface and mineral
owners. The Kuntz approach fairly accommodates these interests to
the extent the parties each realize economic value from their respec-
tive estates. 100
C. The Moser Formulation
In Moser the Texas Supreme Court, noting that the approach in
the Acker and Reed cases had required the determination of a number
of factual issues to interpret an "other minerals" clause, abandoned
the surface destruction test in favor of an ordinary and natural
meaning approach coupled with a workable method of compensa-
tion to the surface owner. According to the court, the old test cre-
ated uncertainty because title readers could not determine
ownership from examining the instrument alone.101 Thus, the Moser
court abandoned, "in the case of uranium,"' 0 2 the Acker and Reed
98 See Lazy D Grazing Ass'n v. Terry Land & Livestock Co., 641 F.2d 844, 846 n.5
(10th Cir. 1981) ("The [Kuntz] approach has the advantage of protecting against an
unintended destruction of the surface estate, without awarding the surface owner the
equally unintended bonus of mineral ownership.").
99 Note, supra note 35, at 417; see also Comment, supra note 35, at 504 ("[t]his theory
is fair to both mineral and surface estate owners," and Kuntz approach is more equitable
than surface destruction test, but it may lead to forced sale).
100 Kuntz specified "the reduction in value of the land for its surface use" as the
appropriate measure of damages. Kuntz, supra note 10, at 115.
101 676 S.W.2d at 101.
102 Id. The original opinion in Moser, Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex.
Sup. Ct. J. 427 (June 8, 1983), which the court withdrew and replaced with the current
opinion, used more sweeping language. It stated, "We now abandon the Acker and Reed
approach to determining ownership of minerals and hold that title to a substance which
we have determined to be a mineral is held by the owner of the mineral estate as a
matter of law." Id. at 428. The language of the official opinion, discussed in this Note,
ties the holding more closely to the facts of the individual case and perhaps fulfills the
court's desire to make its change of course less dramatic.
Although the Moser opinion may be literally interpreted to apply only to uranium,
the Texas courts likely will apply the Moser approach to future "other minerals" contro-
versies involving substances not subject to a previous court determination. See Com-
ment, Determining Mineral Ownership in Texas After Moser v. United States Steel Corp.-The
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approach and held that "title to uranium is held by the owner of the
mineral estate as a matter of law."103
The court reiterated its support of the Kuntz formulation, first
noted in Acker, stating that
the general intent of parties executing a mineral deed or lease is
presumed to be an intent to sever the mineral and surface estates,
convey all valuable substances to the mineral owner regardless of
whether their presence or value was known at the time of convey-
ance, and to preserve the uses incident to each estate.104
The court held that "a severance of minerals in an oil, gas and other
minerals clause includes all substances within the ordinary and natu-
ral meaning of that word"1 0-5 and that "uranium is a mineral within
the ordinary and natural meaning of the word."' 1 6 The court
stated, however, that it would continue to adhere to earlier deci-
sions by Texas courts which held that certain substances belong to
the surface estate as a matter of law.107
The court then turned to the issue of reasonable use of the sur-
face estate by the mineral owner. Before Moser, courts held a min-
Surface Destruction Nightmare Continues, 17 ST. MARY's L.J. 185, 201-03 (1985); Note, Title to
Uranium Is Held by the Mineral Estate Owner as a Matter of Law: Moser v. United States Steel
Corp., 16 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 809, 822-23 (1985). Furthermore, this Note advocates
Moser as a general approach that would be appropriately applied in its broad sense by
states with a less complex history of "other minerals" jurisprudence than Texas.
103 676 S.W.2d at 101.
104 Id. at 102.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. The court cited as examples decisions covering a variety of substances: Reed
v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980) (Reed II) (near-surface lignite, iron, or coal
not included in "other minerals" if any reasonable method of production would damage
surface); Heinatz v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 517-18, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (1949) (limestone
and building stone not included in devise of "mineral rights"); Atwood v. Rodman, 355
S.W.2d 206, 207 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962, writ refd n.r.e.) (limestone, caliche,
and surface shale not included in "oil, gas, and other minerals"); Fleming Found. v.
Texaco, 337 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1960, writ ref d n.r.e.) (water
not a mineral); Psencik v. Wessels, 205 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1947,
writ ref d) (sand and gravel not minerals).
Curiously, the court included near-surface lignite, iron, or coal in its list of sub-
stances that as a matter of law belong to the surface estate, based on Reed II, a seminal
decision in the development of the surface destruction test. Moreover, the Texas courts
have continued to recognize the surface destruction test in subsequent opinions con-
cerning near-surface lignite, iron, or coal. See Schwarz v. State, 28 Tex. Sup. Ct.J. 488,
489 (June 12, 1985); Holland v. Kiper, 696 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Texas Supreme Court contradicted itself in adhering to the re-
sults of Reed II while criticizing the surface destruction test, which it accused of causing
title uncertainty. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 101. Because the Moser court held that the min-
eral owner is liable to the surface owner for damages, the element of surface destruction
should no longer be used to exclude substances that would otherwise be considered
within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word "mineral." See Comment, supra
note 102, at 211-16 (advocating total abandonment of surface destruction test and appli-
cation of Moser to all severances of minerals in Texas).
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eral owner liable to the surface owner only for negligently inflicted
damage to the surface.' 0 8 The Moser court explained the unfairness
of this liability rule in an "other minerals" context:
Restricting the mineral owner's liability to negligently inflicted
damage to, or excessive use of, the surface estate is justified where
a mineral is specifically conveyed. It is reasonable to assume a
grantor who expressly conveys a mineral which may or must be
removed by destroying a portion of the surface estate anticipates
his surface estate will be diminished when the mineral is removed.
It is also probable the grantor has calculated the value of the dimi-
nution of his surface in the compensation received for the convey-
ance. This reasoning is not compelling when a grantor conveys a
mineral which may destroy the surface in a conveyance of "other
minerals." 109
Following this reasoning, the Moser court held that in the "other
minerals" setting "liability of the mineral owner must include com-
pensation to the surface owner for surface destruction."' 10
Although the court did not specify the extent of damages that the
rule should cover, the holding could be read to mandate strict liabil-
ity for damage to the surface estate.111
108 In Texas, the mineral owner or lessee has an implied grant to make any use of
the surface estate that is reasonably necessary to remove the substance. See Sun Oil Co.
v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972) (fresh water underlying land may be used for
production of oil without liability for water used); Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d
618 (Tex. 1971) (use of vertical space for pumping units not reasonably necessary where
prevented surface owner's use of irrigation sprinkler system); Humble Oil & Refining
Co. v. Williams, 420 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1967) (surface owner seeking damages for con-
struction of roads must show that they were built over more of premises than reasonably
necessary). Negligent use of the surface estate by the mineral owner triggers liability to
the surface owner. See General Crude Oil Co. v. Aiken, 344 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1961) (oil
lease operator liable for pollution of underground water due to negligent disposal of
salt water); Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Martin, 153 Tex. 465, 271 S.W.2d 410 (1954)
(mineral lessee has legal right to use as much of leased premises as is reasonably neces-
sary and bears no liability for nonnegligent, unintentional injury to surface owner's cat-
tle); Texaco, Inc. v. Spires, 435 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (mineral lessee liable for loss of horse from negligent construction and mainte-
nance of cattle guard). Moser changed this by making the mineral owner liable for sur-
face estate damages resulting from the extraction of unspecified minerals. See infra text
accompanying notes 109-10.
109 676 S.W.2d at 103.
110 Id.
11, See Note, Mines and Minerals-Title to Minerals-Title to Substances Determnined To Be
Minerals as a Matter of Law Is Held by Owner of the Mineral Estate, 15 ST. MARY'S LJ. 477,
490 (1984) (stating that first opinion in Moser provided strict liability for substances not
enumerated and asserting that "[t]his is a bold decision, since Texas has historically
repudiated in strong language the doctrine of strict liability"; relevant language remains
same in current Moser opinion).
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D. Moser as a Useful Approach to the "Other Minerals"
Question
Moser's approach fulfills the two goals for determining "other
minerals" by combining elements of several other approaches. 1 2
First, the Moser formulation lends stability and certainty to land tides
by applying the ordinary and natural meaning test to sever from the
surface all minerals within the ordinary and natural meaning of the
word. Thus, the Moser approach requires few factual determina-
tions.1 13 The court also provided clarity by enumerating substances
that, according to previous court determinations, are not included
in the ordinary and natural meaning of "minerals."'14 Judicial rec-
ognition of newly discovered substances as minerals or nonminerals
will continue to render the law more stable and reliable.' 15
The Moser formulation also facilitates fair accommodation of
the parties' interests. The approach respects both the mineral
owner's interest in extracting all mineral substances and the surface
owner's interest in protecting the value of his estate. Because Moser
severs ownership of all minerals from the surface estate, the mineral
owner receives tide to all unnamed minerals and enjoys the right to
extract them. This approach is fairer than the ejusdem generis" 6 or
surface destruction' 17 formulations, which may exclude certain sub-
stances commonly recognized as minerals. To mitigate the poten-
tial unfairness of passing tide to an unspecified mineral, the Moser
approach requires that the mineral owner compensate the surface
owner for surface destruction from extraction of the unspecified
mineral, not merely for negligently inflicted damages. Although the
surface owner cannot prevent mineral production on his property
because all minerals belong to the mineral estate, he is made whole
through the payment of damages. Each party realizes the value of
his estate: the mineral owner through mineral production, and the
surface owner through payments from the mineral owner. This
112 The Moser court combined the ordinary and natural meaning test with elements
of the surface destruction test in a manner that avoids many of the most problematic
characteristics of each formulation. Compensating surface owners for damage to their
estate mitigates the harshness of the ordinary and natural meaning test. Moser therefore
demotes the surface destruction approach from its position of determining what is in-
cluded in an "other minerals" clause to a secondary position of determining compensa-
tion for surface damages from the extraction of unspecified substances.
113 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (discussing benefits of ordinary and
natural meaning test). For a discussion of the ordinary and natural meaning test gener-
ally, see supra section II F.
114 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
115 Parties and other title examiners, with increasing frequency, will be able to inter-
pret an instrument by looking only at the face of the document because the courts will
have decreed whether the substance concerned is a mineral.
116 See supra section II A.
117 See supra section II B.
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compromise equalizes the treatment of the parties and ultimately
produces results which satisfy the goal of fairness.
A more complete adoption of the Kuntz approach would ad-
vance title certainty even further than does the Moser-approach. The
Moser court adopted the basic framework of Kuntz,"" but varied
from the theory by adopting the ordinary and natural meaning test.
Indeed, one of the weaknesses 119 of the Moser formulation is the dif-
ficulty courts may encounter in selecting substances included within
the ordinary and natural meaning of "minirals."' 120 The Kuntz ap-
proach does not adhere to the ordinary and natural meaning test
but instead places all valuable substances within the mineral owner's
estate, 21 thus eliminating uncertainty as to what is included in a
mineral grant or reservation. Because the instrument alone is deter-
minative in the Kuntz formulation, it provides greater certainty than
does the Moser approach.
What Moser lacks in certainty, however, it may make up in fair-
ness. Presumably, a court could find that a severance under the
Kuntz framework includes substances such as sand and gravel,
which do not ordinarily constitute minerals. 122 Although the Kuntz
118 Moser, 676 S.W.2d at 102.
119 One weakness in the Moser opinion that the Texas courts will have to clarify is
how to measure damages when calculating compensation to the surface owner. The
Texas courts may choose to apply their existing standards or follow Professor Kuntz's
suggestion that damages should "be measured by the reduction in value of the land for
its surface use." Kuntz, supra note 10, at 115.
Another weakness of Moser, which the Texas Supreme Court has already addressed,
concerns what standards to apply to instruments executed during the period controlled
by the Acker-Reed surface destruction formulation. See supra notes 29-31 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Acker and Reed). The first Moser opinion stated that the surface de-
struction test would continue to apply to instruments executed between the dates of
Acker and the first Moser opinion, Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 26 Tex. Sup. Ct.J.
427, 428 (June 8, 1983), thus creating a "window period" in the law. See Note, Determina-
tion of Ownership of Near-Surface Minerals as a Matter of Law: Moser v. U.S. Steel, 36 BAYLOR
L. REv. 715, 725 (1984). In the second Moser opinion the court held that its new formu-
lation would apply prospectively from the date of the first opinion. Moser, 676 S.W.2d at
103. The Texas Supreme Court addressed the problems of the "window period" and
what standard to apply to pre-Acker conveyances in Friedman v. Texaco, Inc., 691
S.W.2d 586, 587 (1985), holding that the Moser opinion "applies only to those sever-
ances of the surface and mineral estates occurring after [the date of the first Moser
opinion]."
120 But see supra notes 69-72. Although the ordinary and natural meaning test pro-
vides more certainty than the other traditional formulations, it does not yield the title
certainty that the Kuntz approach does, particularly as to newly discovered or newly
valuable substances.
121 Kuntz, supra note 10, at 113 (mineral severance should include "all substances
presently valuable in themselves, apart from the soil, whether their presence is known or
not, and all substances which become valuable through development of the arts and
sciences").
122 A court following the Kuntz theory could reach this conclusion. Under Kuntz
the mineral owner has title to all valuable substances apart from the soil. Kuntz, supra
note 10, at 113. Sand and gravel deposits are valuable apart from the soil.
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framework calls for compensation for surface damages incurred by
removing the sand and gravel, compensation might not make the
surface owner whole if he planned to exploit commercially these
substances as an incident of his estate. The Kuntz framework thus
results in a "forced sale" of the surface estate, because the surface
owner has no choice but to accept compensation from the mineral
owner in return for the destruction of his estate. 123 The Moser ap-
proach mitigates this harshness by applying the ordinary and natural
meaning test to prevent substances not generally recognized as min-
erals from passing to the mineral owner. In sum, although the
Kuntz formulation would result in greater title stability, Moser may
represent a better balance between stability of title and fairness to
the interests of the parties.
CONCLUSION
Deeds, leases, and other instruments frequently convey or re-
serve "other minerals" without specifically enumerating those min-
erals. As a result, parties have been forced to call upon the courts to
determine the scope of the "other minerals" language with regard
to unspecified substances. All formulations for the determination of
unspecified minerals should meet two goals: first, promoting the
stability and certainty of land titles, and, second, fairly accommodat-
ing the interests of the parties. Unfortunately, courts deciding
"other minerals" questions traditionally have relied on formulations
that do not satisfactorily advance or accommodate these goals.
Although the courts may have found one or another of the tradi-
tional formulations useful in individual cases, these formulations do
not adequately serve as standards for new fact situations. Conse-
quently, the courts are often in conflict, land titles are unstable, the
interests of the parties are abused, and the development of mineral
resources is hindered.
In Moser, the Texas Supreme Court developed a formulation
that includes within "other minerals" substances falling within the
ordinary and natural meaning of the word "mineral." This formula-
tion substantially eliminates the uncertainty of determining an un-
specified mineral and fosters title stability. The Moser court also
held that mineral owners are liable to surface owners for surface
damage resulting from the extraction of "other minerals." This re-
quirement fairly accommodates the interests of the parties by ensur-
ing that each party may enjoy the economic benefits of his estate
without diminishing the value of the other estate.
Courts seeking to adopt an "other minerals" formulation that
123 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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meets the goals of stability and fairness should adopt the Moser ap-
proach because it is a superior alternative to the unsatisfactory tradi-
tional formulations.
Brant M. Laue
